Who's Afraid of Butterflies? A Close Examination of the Butterfly Attack

Sanjoy Baruah, Pontus Ekberg, Mehdi Hosseinzadeh, Ao Li, Bryan Ward, Ning Zhang

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

3 Scopus citations

Abstract

The Butterfly Attack, introduced in an RTSS 2019 paper, was billed as a new kind of timing attack against control loops in cyber-physical systems. We conduct a close inspection of the Butterfly Attack in order to identify the root vulnerability that it exploits, and show that an appropriate application of real-time scheduling theory provides an effective countermeasure. We propose improved defenses against this and similar attacks by drawing upon techniques from real-time scheduling theory, control theory, and systems implementation, that are both provably secure and are able to make efficient use of computing resources.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication44th IEEE Real-Time Systems Symposium, RTSS 2023
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages53-63
Number of pages11
ISBN (Electronic)9798350328578
DOIs
StatePublished - 2023
Event44th IEEE Real-Time Systems Symposium, RTSS 2023 - Taipei, Taiwan, Province of China
Duration: Dec 5 2023Dec 8 2023

Publication series

NameProceedings - Real-Time Systems Symposium
ISSN (Print)1052-8725

Conference

Conference44th IEEE Real-Time Systems Symposium, RTSS 2023
Country/TerritoryTaiwan, Province of China
CityTaipei
Period12/5/2312/8/23

Keywords

  • CPS security
  • attack mitigation
  • real-time control
  • real-time scheduling

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