Virtue Epistemology, Two Kinds of Internalism, and the Intelligibility Problem

  • Jonathan L. Kvanvig

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterpeer-review

1 Scopus citations

Abstract

This chapter compares virtue epistemology to two types of Internalisms, Statism and Propositionalism in light of the intelligibility problem first raised by Sellars. It explains the problem and argues that both virtue epistemology and Statism are subject to this problem. Even thoughPrropositionalism is designed to address the problem, the problem is much more difficult to solve than is recognized. I show why, and what a solution to the problem might look like.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationVirtue Theoretic Epistemology
Subtitle of host publicationNew Methods and Approaches
PublisherCambridge University Press
Pages147-165
Number of pages19
ISBN (Electronic)9781108666404
ISBN (Print)9781108481212
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2020

Keywords

  • Externalism
  • Intelligibility problem
  • Internalism
  • Propositionalism
  • Safety
  • Sensitivity
  • Statism
  • Truth-tracking
  • Virtue epistemology

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