Theoretical Unity in Epistemology

Epistemology is more than the theory of knowledge. It involves reflection on and theorizing about cognitive successes from a purely theoretical or intellectual point of view, one that brackets other concerns such as practical, moral, and aesthetic ones. Knowledge is certainly one success of this sort, but not the only one. In addition, there are the great achievements of understanding and wisdom, as well as the ordinary accomplishments of having rational opinions and justified beliefs. Multiplicity, however, can lead to fragmented theorizing. Fragmentation can arise by ignoring much of the theoretical landscape, as when one limits one’s theorizing in epistemology to the theory of knowledge. Fragmentation can also arise by addressing more (or even all) of the landscape, but not in a unified fashion. For example, one might be a Chisholmian foundationalist about justification while also being a virtue epistemologist about knowledge. Fragmentation is disappointing. Just as it is disappointing to be told that the laws of terrestrial motion have little in common with the laws of celestial motion, so too is disunity in epistemology something to lament. It is worthwhile, then, to compare some possible ways of avoiding such fragmentation, to see whether there is any hope for greater unification regarding the variety of items in our epistemological landscape. My goal will be to argue in a very tentative way for the superior prospects for unity found by taking the theory of confirmation as fundamental to epistemological theorizing, at least when compared to the extant rivals of a knowledge-first approach and a reasons-based account.