The slippery slope of concession

Jack Hirshleifer; Michele Boldrin; David K. Levine

doi:10.1111/j.1465-7295.2008.00154.x

The slippery slope of concession

Jack Hirshleifer
, Michele Boldrin
, David K. Levine

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

7 Scopus citations

Abstract

We show that with common knowledge and a common rate of time preference, the potential loser can always avoid wasteful conflict through a time-consistent series of small concessions. We examine how the failure of each of these assumptions may explain why conflicts arise. We also debate which actions may be helpful in such unfortunate circumstances.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	197-205
Number of pages	9
Journal	Economic Inquiry
Volume	47
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7295.2008.00154.x
State	Published - Apr 2009

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10.1111/j.1465-7295.2008.00154.x

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The slippery slope of concession

Abstract

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