The electoral benefits of opportunistic election timing

Petra Schleiter, Margit Tavits

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    50 Scopus citations

    Abstract

    This study explores the effect of opportunistic election timing on the incumbent's electoral performance. While the existing literature leads to contradictory predictions about the ability of incumbent governments to benefit from strategically timed elections. We advance the theoretical debate by presenting the first cross-national comparative analysis of this question, drawing on an original data set of 318 parliamentary elections in 27 Eastern and Western European countries. In order to identify the effect of opportunistic election calling, we rely on instrumental variable regression. The results demonstrate that opportunistic election calling generates a vote share bonus for the incumbent of about 5 percentage points and is thereby likely to affect electoral accountability.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)836-850
    Number of pages15
    JournalJournal of Politics
    Volume78
    Issue number3
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Jul 2016

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