Abstract
According to Chief Justice John Roberts, the most difficult issue facing the federal judiciary is low judicial salaries. His view, shared by other Justices, many federal judges, the American Bar Association, and prominent law school deans, is that low salaries deter many of the most qualified candidates from considering the bench. This Article examines the impact of judicial pay on the performance of the federal circuit courts. I exploit variation in the next best financial opportunity for most circuit judges - partnership in a regional law firm - to determine the impact of low judicial salaries. With high judicial salaries, judges give up little money as against their next best opportunity to take the bench. With low judicial salaries, judges give up a lot of money to take the bench. Comparison of the performance of judges with varying "spreads " allows for a prediction about the likely impact of higher judicial salaries. This Article finds that low judicial salaries do not affect the nature of votes in controversial cases, the speed of controversial case disposition, the frequency of citation to outside circuit authority, or the strength of opinions as measured by citation counts. This Article does find, however, that low salaries lead to slightly fewer dissents. This effect, while statistically significant, is nonetheless practically trivial. In short, this Article finds that judicial pay is largely irrelevant to the performance of the circuit courts.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 63-112 |
| Number of pages | 50 |
| Journal | Boston University Law Review |
| Volume | 88 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| State | Published - Feb 2008 |