Security games with contagion: Handling asymmetric information

Jason Tsai; Yundi Qian; Milind Tambe; Yevgeniy Vorobeychik; Christopher Kiekintveld

Security games with contagion: Handling asymmetric information

Jason Tsai
, Yundi Qian
, Milind Tambe
, Yevgeniy Vorobeychik
, Christopher Kiekintveld

Department of Computer Science & Engineering

Research output: Contribution to conference › Paper › peer-review

Abstract

Counterinsurgency, which is the effort to mitigate support for an opposing organization, is one such domain that has been studied recently and past work has modeled the problem as an influence blocking maximization that features an influencer and a mitigator. While past work has introduced scalable heuristic techniques for generating effective strategies using a double oracle algorithm, it has not addressed the issue of uncertainty and asymmetric information, which is the topic of this paper.

Original language	English
Pages	1185-1186
Number of pages	2
State	Published - 2013
Event	12th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems 2013, AAMAS 2013 - Saint Paul, MN, United States Duration: May 6 2013 → May 10 2013

Conference

Conference	12th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems 2013, AAMAS 2013
Country/Territory	United States
City	Saint Paul, MN
Period	05/6/13 → 05/10/13

Keywords

Game theory
Influence maximization
Social contagion

Cite this

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title = "Security games with contagion: Handling asymmetric information",

abstract = "Counterinsurgency, which is the effort to mitigate support for an opposing organization, is one such domain that has been studied recently and past work has modeled the problem as an influence blocking maximization that features an influencer and a mitigator. While past work has introduced scalable heuristic techniques for generating effective strategies using a double oracle algorithm, it has not addressed the issue of uncertainty and asymmetric information, which is the topic of this paper.",

keywords = "Game theory, Influence maximization, Social contagion",

author = "Jason Tsai and Yundi Qian and Milind Tambe and Yevgeniy Vorobeychik and Christopher Kiekintveld",

year = "2013",

language = "English",

pages = "1185--1186",

note = "12th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems 2013, AAMAS 2013 ; Conference date: 06-05-2013 Through 10-05-2013",

}

TY - CONF

T1 - Security games with contagion

T2 - 12th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems 2013, AAMAS 2013

AU - Tsai, Jason

AU - Qian, Yundi

AU - Tambe, Milind

AU - Vorobeychik, Yevgeniy

AU - Kiekintveld, Christopher

PY - 2013

Y1 - 2013

N2 - Counterinsurgency, which is the effort to mitigate support for an opposing organization, is one such domain that has been studied recently and past work has modeled the problem as an influence blocking maximization that features an influencer and a mitigator. While past work has introduced scalable heuristic techniques for generating effective strategies using a double oracle algorithm, it has not addressed the issue of uncertainty and asymmetric information, which is the topic of this paper.

AB - Counterinsurgency, which is the effort to mitigate support for an opposing organization, is one such domain that has been studied recently and past work has modeled the problem as an influence blocking maximization that features an influencer and a mitigator. While past work has introduced scalable heuristic techniques for generating effective strategies using a double oracle algorithm, it has not addressed the issue of uncertainty and asymmetric information, which is the topic of this paper.

KW - Game theory

KW - Influence maximization

KW - Social contagion

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/84899441184

M3 - Paper

AN - SCOPUS:84899441184

SP - 1185

EP - 1186

Y2 - 6 May 2013 through 10 May 2013

ER -

Security games with contagion: Handling asymmetric information

Abstract

Conference

Keywords

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