RADICAL KNOWLEDGE MINIMALISM

Jeremy Fantl; Matthew Mcgrath

doi:10.5840/logos-episteme202314216

RADICAL KNOWLEDGE MINIMALISM

Jeremy Fantl
, Matthew Mcgrath

Department of Philosophy

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

We argue that knowledge doesn‘t require any of truth, justification, or belief. This is so for four primary reasons. First, each of the three conditions has been subject to convincing counterexamples. In addition, the resultant account explains the value of knowledge, manifests important theoretical virtues (in particular, simplicity), and avoids commitment to skepticism.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	223-227
Number of pages	5
Journal	Logos and Episteme
Volume	14
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme202314216
State	Published - 2023

Keywords

belief
justification
knowledge minimalism
skepticism
truth

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10.5840/logos-episteme202314216

Cite this

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KW - skepticism

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RADICAL KNOWLEDGE MINIMALISM

Abstract

Keywords

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