Quantile stable mechanisms

Peter Chen; Michael Egesdal; Marek Pycia; M. Bumin Yenmez

doi:10.3390/g12020043

Quantile stable mechanisms

Peter Chen
, Michael Egesdal
, Marek Pycia
, M. Bumin Yenmez

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

2 Scopus citations

Abstract

We introduce a new class of matching mechanisms—quantile stable mechanisms—that generate stable matchings that can be seen as a compromise between sides of a two-sided market. We show that responsiveness is a sufficient condition for the existence of such mechanisms and that all such mechanisms are distinct. We also analyze the manipulability of these mechanisms by market participants.

Original language	English
Article number	43
Journal	Games
Volume	12
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.3390/g12020043
State	Published - Jun 2021

Keywords

Auctions
Contracts
Incentives
matching
Mechanisms

Access to Document

10.3390/g12020043

Cite this

@article{01de8187df8e4745911bafc490d9b776,

title = "Quantile stable mechanisms",

abstract = "We introduce a new class of matching mechanisms—quantile stable mechanisms—that generate stable matchings that can be seen as a compromise between sides of a two-sided market. We show that responsiveness is a sufficient condition for the existence of such mechanisms and that all such mechanisms are distinct. We also analyze the manipulability of these mechanisms by market participants.",

keywords = "Auctions, Contracts, Incentives, matching, Mechanisms",

author = "Peter Chen and Michael Egesdal and Marek Pycia and Yenmez, \{M. Bumin\}",

note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2021 by the authors. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland.",

year = "2021",

month = jun,

doi = "10.3390/g12020043",

language = "English",

volume = "12",

journal = "Games",

issn = "2073-4336",

number = "2",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Quantile stable mechanisms

AU - Chen, Peter

AU - Egesdal, Michael

AU - Pycia, Marek

AU - Yenmez, M. Bumin

PY - 2021/6

Y1 - 2021/6

N2 - We introduce a new class of matching mechanisms—quantile stable mechanisms—that generate stable matchings that can be seen as a compromise between sides of a two-sided market. We show that responsiveness is a sufficient condition for the existence of such mechanisms and that all such mechanisms are distinct. We also analyze the manipulability of these mechanisms by market participants.

AB - We introduce a new class of matching mechanisms—quantile stable mechanisms—that generate stable matchings that can be seen as a compromise between sides of a two-sided market. We show that responsiveness is a sufficient condition for the existence of such mechanisms and that all such mechanisms are distinct. We also analyze the manipulability of these mechanisms by market participants.

KW - Auctions

KW - Contracts

KW - Incentives

KW - matching

KW - Mechanisms

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85106929852

U2 - 10.3390/g12020043

DO - 10.3390/g12020043

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:85106929852

SN - 2073-4336

VL - 12

JO - Games

JF - Games

IS - 2

M1 - 43

ER -

Quantile stable mechanisms

Abstract

Keywords

Access to Document

Other files and links

Fingerprint

Cite this