Multidefender Security Games

Current Stackelberg security game models primarily focus on isolated systems in which only one defender is present, despite being part of a more complex system with multiple players. However, many real systems such as transportation networks and the power grid exhibit interdependencies among targets and, consequently, between decision makers jointly charged with protecting them. To understand such multidefender strategic interactions present in security scenarios, the authors investigate security games with multiple defenders. Unlike most prior analyses, they focus on situations in which each defender must protect multiple targets, so even a single defender's best response decision is, in general, nontrivial. Considering interdependencies among targets, the authors develop a novel mixed-integer linear programming formulation to compute a defender's best response, and approximate Nash equilibria of the game using this formulation. Their analysis shows how network structure and the probability of failure spread determine the propensity of defenders to over-or underinvest in security.