Manipulability of stable mechanisms

Peter Chen; Michael Egesdal; Marek Pycia; M. Bumin Yenmez

doi:10.1257/mic.20150035

Manipulability of stable mechanisms

Peter Chen
, Michael Egesdal
, Marek Pycia
, M. Bumin Yenmez

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

24 Scopus citations

Abstract

We study the manipulability of stable matching mechanisms and show that manipulability comparisons are equivalent to preference comparisons: for any agent, a mechanism is more manipulable than another if and only if this agent prefers the latter to the former. One important implication is that when agents on one side of the market have unit demand, no stable matching mechanism is less manipulable than another for all agents.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	202-214
Number of pages	13
Journal	American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
Volume	8
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20150035
State	Published - May 1 2016

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10.1257/mic.20150035

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AB - We study the manipulability of stable matching mechanisms and show that manipulability comparisons are equivalent to preference comparisons: for any agent, a mechanism is more manipulable than another if and only if this agent prefers the latter to the former. One important implication is that when agents on one side of the market have unit demand, no stable matching mechanism is less manipulable than another for all agents.

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Manipulability of stable mechanisms

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