TY - GEN
T1 - Learning Binary Multi-Scale Games on Networks
AU - Yu, Sixie
AU - Brantingham, P. Jeffrey
AU - Valasik, Matthew
AU - Vorobeychik, Yevgeniy
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2022 Proceedings of the 38th Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, UAI 2022. All right reserved.
PY - 2022
Y1 - 2022
N2 - Network games are a natural modeling framework for strategic interactions of agents whose actions have local impact on others. Recently, a multi-scale network game model has been proposed to capture local effects at multiple network scales, such as among both individuals and groups. We propose a framework to learn the utility functions of binary multi-scale games from agents' behavioral data. Departing from much prior work in this area, we model agent behavior as following logit-response dynamics, rather than acting according to a Nash equilibrium. This defines a generative time-series model of joint behavior of both agents and groups, which enables us to naturally cast the learning problem as maximum likelihood estimation (MLE). We show that in the important special case of multi-scale linear-quadratic games, this MLE problem is convex. Extensive experiments using both synthetic and real data demonstrate that our proposed modeling and learning approach is effective in both game parameter estimation as well as prediction of future behavior, even when we learn the game from only a single behavior time series. Furthermore, we show how to use our framework to develop a statistical test for the existence of multi-scale structure in the game, and use it to demonstrate that real time-series data indeed exhibits such structure.
AB - Network games are a natural modeling framework for strategic interactions of agents whose actions have local impact on others. Recently, a multi-scale network game model has been proposed to capture local effects at multiple network scales, such as among both individuals and groups. We propose a framework to learn the utility functions of binary multi-scale games from agents' behavioral data. Departing from much prior work in this area, we model agent behavior as following logit-response dynamics, rather than acting according to a Nash equilibrium. This defines a generative time-series model of joint behavior of both agents and groups, which enables us to naturally cast the learning problem as maximum likelihood estimation (MLE). We show that in the important special case of multi-scale linear-quadratic games, this MLE problem is convex. Extensive experiments using both synthetic and real data demonstrate that our proposed modeling and learning approach is effective in both game parameter estimation as well as prediction of future behavior, even when we learn the game from only a single behavior time series. Furthermore, we show how to use our framework to develop a statistical test for the existence of multi-scale structure in the game, and use it to demonstrate that real time-series data indeed exhibits such structure.
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85146147784
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85146147784
T3 - Proceedings of the 38th Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, UAI 2022
SP - 2310
EP - 2319
BT - Proceedings of the 38th Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, UAI 2022
PB - Association For Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence (AUAI)
T2 - 38th Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, UAI 2022
Y2 - 1 August 2022 through 5 August 2022
ER -