Ideology and the Study of Judicial Behavior

  • Lee Epstein
  • , Andrew D. Martin
  • , Kevin M. Quinn
  • , Jeffrey A. Segal

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterpeer-review

Abstract

This chapter explores the role of ideology in the study of judicial behavior. From the antecedents of the attitudinal model to newer strategic accounts, ideology plays a key role in political science explanations of judging. Measuring ideology in this context is quite difficult. This chapter describes the strengths and weaknesses of various strategies, including the political party of the judges, exogenous measures developed by Segal and Cover from newspaper editorials, and endogenous measures developed by Martin and Quinn using observed behavior. Empirical studies employing these measures show strong patterns of ideological behavior on the U.S. Supreme Court, with mixed findings for the lower courts.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationIdeology, Psychology, and Law
PublisherOxford University Press
ISBN (Electronic)9780199918638
ISBN (Print)9780199737512
DOIs
StatePublished - May 24 2012

Keywords

  • Attitudinal model
  • Ideal-point estimates
  • Ideological amplification
  • Ideological dampening
  • Ideology
  • Judges
  • Judicial behavior
  • Measures of ideology
  • Panel effects
  • Strategic accounts
  • Supreme court

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