Family Decision Making

Shelly Lundberg; Robert A. Pollak

doi:10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2551

Family Decision Making

Shelly Lundberg
, Robert A. Pollak

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Chapter › peer-review

Abstract

The classic unitary model assumes that households maximize a household utility function and implies resource ‘pooling’ - household behaviour does not depend on individuals’ control over resources within the household. Since the 1980s, economists have modified the unitary model in ways that have theoretical, empirical and practical implications. Non-unitary alternatives based on joint decision-making by individual family members with distinct preferences broaden the range of observable behaviour consistent with economic rationality. Many non-unitary models imply that both individuals’ control over resources and ‘environmental factors’ can affect intra-household allocation. Empirical evidence has consistently rejected income pooling and, hence, the unitary model.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, Third Edition
Publisher	Palgrave Macmillan
Pages	4443-4450
Number of pages	8
ISBN (Electronic)	9781349951895
ISBN (Print)	9781349951888
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2551
State	Published - Jan 1 2018

Keywords

Altruist model of the family
Bargaining
Collective model of the household
Consensus model of the family
Cooperative bargaining model of marriage
Cooperative games
Cournot-Nash equilibrium
Family decisionmaking
Gender specialization
Household production and public goods
Marriage and divorce
Non-cooperative bargaining model of marriage
Rotten kid theorem
Selfenforcing agreements
Separate spheres bargaining model
Slutsky symmetry
Twostage games
Unitary and non-unitary models of the household

Access to Document

10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2551

Cite this

@inbook{1a5ef9f172be48afb13c94f14abeabe0,

title = "Family Decision Making",

abstract = "The classic unitary model assumes that households maximize a household utility function and implies resource {\textquoteleft}pooling{\textquoteright} - household behaviour does not depend on individuals{\textquoteright} control over resources within the household. Since the 1980s, economists have modified the unitary model in ways that have theoretical, empirical and practical implications. Non-unitary alternatives based on joint decision-making by individual family members with distinct preferences broaden the range of observable behaviour consistent with economic rationality. Many non-unitary models imply that both individuals{\textquoteright} control over resources and {\textquoteleft}environmental factors{\textquoteright} can affect intra-household allocation. Empirical evidence has consistently rejected income pooling and, hence, the unitary model.",

keywords = "Altruist model of the family, Bargaining, Collective model of the household, Consensus model of the family, Cooperative bargaining model of marriage, Cooperative games, Cournot-Nash equilibrium, Family decisionmaking, Gender specialization, Household production and public goods, Marriage and divorce, Non-cooperative bargaining model of marriage, Rotten kid theorem, Selfenforcing agreements, Separate spheres bargaining model, Slutsky symmetry, Twostage games, Unitary and non-unitary models of the household",

author = "Shelly Lundberg and Pollak, \{Robert A.\}",

note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2018.",

year = "2018",

month = jan,

day = "1",

doi = "10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5\_2551",

language = "English",

isbn = "9781349951888",

pages = "4443--4450",

booktitle = "The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, Third Edition",

publisher = "Palgrave Macmillan",

}

TY - CHAP

T1 - Family Decision Making

AU - Lundberg, Shelly

AU - Pollak, Robert A.

N1 - Publisher Copyright: © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2018.

PY - 2018/1/1

Y1 - 2018/1/1

N2 - The classic unitary model assumes that households maximize a household utility function and implies resource ‘pooling’ - household behaviour does not depend on individuals’ control over resources within the household. Since the 1980s, economists have modified the unitary model in ways that have theoretical, empirical and practical implications. Non-unitary alternatives based on joint decision-making by individual family members with distinct preferences broaden the range of observable behaviour consistent with economic rationality. Many non-unitary models imply that both individuals’ control over resources and ‘environmental factors’ can affect intra-household allocation. Empirical evidence has consistently rejected income pooling and, hence, the unitary model.

AB - The classic unitary model assumes that households maximize a household utility function and implies resource ‘pooling’ - household behaviour does not depend on individuals’ control over resources within the household. Since the 1980s, economists have modified the unitary model in ways that have theoretical, empirical and practical implications. Non-unitary alternatives based on joint decision-making by individual family members with distinct preferences broaden the range of observable behaviour consistent with economic rationality. Many non-unitary models imply that both individuals’ control over resources and ‘environmental factors’ can affect intra-household allocation. Empirical evidence has consistently rejected income pooling and, hence, the unitary model.

KW - Altruist model of the family

KW - Bargaining

KW - Collective model of the household

KW - Consensus model of the family

KW - Cooperative bargaining model of marriage

KW - Cooperative games

KW - Cournot-Nash equilibrium

KW - Family decisionmaking

KW - Gender specialization

KW - Household production and public goods

KW - Marriage and divorce

KW - Non-cooperative bargaining model of marriage

KW - Rotten kid theorem

KW - Selfenforcing agreements

KW - Separate spheres bargaining model

KW - Slutsky symmetry

KW - Twostage games

KW - Unitary and non-unitary models of the household

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/105011016629

U2 - 10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2551

DO - 10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2551

M3 - Chapter

AN - SCOPUS:105011016629

SN - 9781349951888

SP - 4443

EP - 4450

BT - The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, Third Edition

PB - Palgrave Macmillan

ER -

Family Decision Making

Abstract

Keywords

Access to Document

Other files and links

Fingerprint

Cite this