Factive Presupposition and the Truth Condition on Knowledge

Allan Hazlett

doi:10.1007/s12136-012-0163-3

Factive Presupposition and the Truth Condition on Knowledge

Allan Hazlett

Department of Philosophy

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

38 Scopus citations

Abstract

In this paper I argue, against some recent criticisms, that the factivity of "knows" does not support the traditional truth condition on knowledge. I articulate a conception of the factivity of "knows" on which it is a matter of cancelable pragmatic presupposition, and consider the epistemological implications of this.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	461-478
Number of pages	18
Journal	Acta Analytica
Volume	27
Issue number	4
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-012-0163-3
State	Published - Dec 2012

Keywords

Factive verbs
Knowledge
Presupposition

Access to Document

10.1007/s12136-012-0163-3

Cite this

@article{6301da80cf844083bee9cb90fe88af61,

title = "Factive Presupposition and the Truth Condition on Knowledge",

abstract = "In this paper I argue, against some recent criticisms, that the factivity of {"}knows{"} does not support the traditional truth condition on knowledge. I articulate a conception of the factivity of {"}knows{"} on which it is a matter of cancelable pragmatic presupposition, and consider the epistemological implications of this.",

keywords = "Factive verbs, Knowledge, Presupposition",

author = "Allan Hazlett",

year = "2012",

month = dec,

doi = "10.1007/s12136-012-0163-3",

language = "English",

volume = "27",

pages = "461--478",

journal = "Acta Analytica",

issn = "0353-5150",

number = "4",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Factive Presupposition and the Truth Condition on Knowledge

AU - Hazlett, Allan

PY - 2012/12

Y1 - 2012/12

N2 - In this paper I argue, against some recent criticisms, that the factivity of "knows" does not support the traditional truth condition on knowledge. I articulate a conception of the factivity of "knows" on which it is a matter of cancelable pragmatic presupposition, and consider the epistemological implications of this.

AB - In this paper I argue, against some recent criticisms, that the factivity of "knows" does not support the traditional truth condition on knowledge. I articulate a conception of the factivity of "knows" on which it is a matter of cancelable pragmatic presupposition, and consider the epistemological implications of this.

KW - Factive verbs

KW - Knowledge

KW - Presupposition

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84870463163&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1007/s12136-012-0163-3

DO - 10.1007/s12136-012-0163-3

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:84870463163

SN - 0353-5150

VL - 27

SP - 461

EP - 478

JO - Acta Analytica

JF - Acta Analytica

IS - 4

ER -

Factive Presupposition and the Truth Condition on Knowledge

Abstract

Keywords

Access to Document

Other files and links

Fingerprint

Cite this