TY - JOUR
T1 - Event perception
AU - Radvansky, Gabriel A.
AU - Zacks, Jeffrey M.
N1 - Funding Information:
Preparation of this chapter was supported in part by NIH grants R01-MH70674 and R01-AG031150 and by NSF grant BCS-0236651, all to Jeff Zacks. The authors thank Dave Balota, Jordan Grafman, Joe Magliano, G. A. Radvansky, and Rose Zacks for helpful comments on the manuscript.
PY - 2011/11
Y1 - 2011/11
N2 - Events are central elements of human experience. Formally, they can be individuated in terms of the entities that compose them, the features of those entities, and the relations amongst entities. Psychologically, representations of events capture their spatiotemporal location, the people and objects involved, and the relations between these elements. Here, we present an account of the nature of psychological representations of events and how they are constructed and updated. Event representations are like images in that they are isomorphic to the situations they represent. However, they are like models or language in that they are constructed of components rather than being holistic. Also, they are partial representations that leave out some elements and abstract others. Representations of individual events are informed by schematic knowledge about general classes of events. Event representations are constructed in a process that segments continuous activity into discrete events. The construction of a series of event representations forms a basis for predicting the future, planning for that future, and imagining alternatives.
AB - Events are central elements of human experience. Formally, they can be individuated in terms of the entities that compose them, the features of those entities, and the relations amongst entities. Psychologically, representations of events capture their spatiotemporal location, the people and objects involved, and the relations between these elements. Here, we present an account of the nature of psychological representations of events and how they are constructed and updated. Event representations are like images in that they are isomorphic to the situations they represent. However, they are like models or language in that they are constructed of components rather than being holistic. Also, they are partial representations that leave out some elements and abstract others. Representations of individual events are informed by schematic knowledge about general classes of events. Event representations are constructed in a process that segments continuous activity into discrete events. The construction of a series of event representations forms a basis for predicting the future, planning for that future, and imagining alternatives.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=80054751146&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1002/wcs.133
DO - 10.1002/wcs.133
M3 - Review article
AN - SCOPUS:80054751146
SN - 1939-5078
VL - 2
SP - 608
EP - 620
JO - Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science
JF - Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science
IS - 6
ER -