TY - JOUR
T1 - Does what we dream feel present? Two varieties of presence and implications for measuring presence in VR
AU - Barkasi, Michael
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2020, Springer Nature B.V.
PY - 2021/12
Y1 - 2021/12
N2 - What’s presented in our normal waking perceptual visual experiences feels present to us, while what we “see” in pictures and imagine does not. What about dreams? Does what we “see” in a dream feel present? Jennifer Windt has argued for an affirmative answer, for all dreams. But the dreams which flow from the brain’s registration of myoclonic twitches (body-driven dreams) present a challenge to this answer. During these dreams (so I argue) motion-guiding vision is shut off, and, as Mohan Matthen has argued, motion-guiding vision seems to be a key mechanism underlying the feeling of presence. I propose that the feeling of presence in fact involves two components: the feeling of immersion, and the feeling of availability for action. I suggest that only the feeling of availability for action derives from motion-guiding vision, and, hence, hypothesize that body-driven dreams lack this component to the feeling of presence (while still having the feeling of immersion). Finally, the distinction between these two varieties of presence has implications for measures of presence in virtual environments, as these measures can diverge over which of the two varieties they track.
AB - What’s presented in our normal waking perceptual visual experiences feels present to us, while what we “see” in pictures and imagine does not. What about dreams? Does what we “see” in a dream feel present? Jennifer Windt has argued for an affirmative answer, for all dreams. But the dreams which flow from the brain’s registration of myoclonic twitches (body-driven dreams) present a challenge to this answer. During these dreams (so I argue) motion-guiding vision is shut off, and, as Mohan Matthen has argued, motion-guiding vision seems to be a key mechanism underlying the feeling of presence. I propose that the feeling of presence in fact involves two components: the feeling of immersion, and the feeling of availability for action. I suggest that only the feeling of availability for action derives from motion-guiding vision, and, hence, hypothesize that body-driven dreams lack this component to the feeling of presence (while still having the feeling of immersion). Finally, the distinction between these two varieties of presence has implications for measures of presence in virtual environments, as these measures can diverge over which of the two varieties they track.
KW - Dreams
KW - Embodied experience
KW - Motion-guiding vision
KW - Myoclonic twitches
KW - Presence
KW - Virtual environments
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85092181134&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/s11229-020-02898-4
DO - 10.1007/s11229-020-02898-4
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85092181134
SN - 0039-7857
VL - 199
SP - 2525
EP - 2551
JO - Synthese
JF - Synthese
IS - 1-2
ER -