Does Temporary Mortgage Assistance for Unemployed Homeowners Reduce Longer-Term Mortgage Default? An Analysis of the Hardest Hit Fund Program

  • Stephanie Moulton
  • , Yung Chun
  • , Stephanie Casey Pierce
  • , Roberto Quercia
  • , Sarah Riley
  • , Holly Holtzen

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    5 Scopus citations

    Abstract

    Economic crises like the Great Recession and the COVID pandemic prompt government intervention to stabilize homeowners and housing markets. During the Great Recession, the primary intervention was permanent loan modifications, with mixed evidence of success. The COVID pandemic spurred a more targeted but temporary intervention—mortgage payment relief for unemployed homeowners. Little is known about the long-term effectiveness of temporary mortgage assistance for homeowner outcomes. This paper leverages data on the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Hardest Hit Fund (HHF) program to analyze the longer-term effects of temporary mortgage payment subsidies on mortgage default. Our first research design exploits the fact that some states were not eligible to offer an HHF program and that certain Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) encompass jurisdictions in both HHF and non-HHF states. In a second research design, we model selection into the HHF program directly, exploiting lender variation in program participation as an instrument. Our results indicate that receipt of HHF assistance leads to a 40 percent reduction in the probability of mortgage default and foreclosure through four years post assistance. We estimate heterogeneous effects for different at-risk populations and discuss implications for policy.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)515-551
    Number of pages37
    JournalJournal of Policy Analysis and Management
    Volume41
    Issue number2
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Mar 1 2022

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