Dissolving multi-partnerships efficiently

M. Bumin Yenmez

doi:10.1016/j.jmateco.2012.01.001

Dissolving multi-partnerships efficiently

M. Bumin Yenmez

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

6 Scopus citations

Abstract

I study a market where agents with unit demand jointly own heterogeneous goods. In this market, the existence of an efficient, incentive compatible, individually rational, and budget balanced mechanism depends on the shares of the agents. I characterize the set of shares for which having such a mechanism is possible. This set includes the symmetric allocation and excludes the allocation in which every agent owns a separate good.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	77-82
Number of pages	6
Journal	Journal of Mathematical Economics
Volume	48
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2012.01.001
State	Published - Mar 2012

Keywords

Efficient mechanisms
Multi-object auctions
Multidimensional types

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10.1016/j.jmateco.2012.01.001

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title = "Dissolving multi-partnerships efficiently",

abstract = "I study a market where agents with unit demand jointly own heterogeneous goods. In this market, the existence of an efficient, incentive compatible, individually rational, and budget balanced mechanism depends on the shares of the agents. I characterize the set of shares for which having such a mechanism is possible. This set includes the symmetric allocation and excludes the allocation in which every agent owns a separate good.",

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AB - I study a market where agents with unit demand jointly own heterogeneous goods. In this market, the existence of an efficient, incentive compatible, individually rational, and budget balanced mechanism depends on the shares of the agents. I characterize the set of shares for which having such a mechanism is possible. This set includes the symmetric allocation and excludes the allocation in which every agent owns a separate good.

KW - Efficient mechanisms

KW - Multi-object auctions

KW - Multidimensional types

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/84858748583

U2 - 10.1016/j.jmateco.2012.01.001

DO - 10.1016/j.jmateco.2012.01.001

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:84858748583

SN - 0304-4068

VL - 48

SP - 77

EP - 82

JO - Journal of Mathematical Economics

JF - Journal of Mathematical Economics

IS - 2

ER -

Dissolving multi-partnerships efficiently

Abstract

Keywords

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