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Discrete choice models of firms' strategic decisions

  • Michaela Draganska
  • , Sanjog Misra
  • , Victor Aguirregabiria
  • , Pat Bajari
  • , Liran Einav
  • , Paul Ellickson
  • , Dan Horsky
  • , Sridhar Narayanan
  • , Yesim Orhun
  • , Peter Reiss
  • , Katja Seim
  • , Vishal Singh
  • , Raphael Thomadsen
  • , Ting Zhu

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    Abstract

    This paper outlines the methods and applications related to the nascent area of empirical discrete games in marketing. Many key strategic decisions firms make involve discrete choices such as deciding the location of a new store, determining where in product space to position a product, or what options to offer in a service contract. These decisions are fairly complex and typically involve the consideration of a number of demand, cost, and competitive factors. What makes these discrete choices particularly interesting (and challenging to analyze) is that they are interrelated with the choices of other firms because firms take into account the actions of their competitors when making their own decisions. We describe the basic problem of dealing with interrelated discrete choices in a game-theoretic framework and present the various estimation methods available. A discussion of the existing applications and future research opportunities concludes the article.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)399-416
    Number of pages18
    JournalMarketing Letters
    Volume19
    Issue number3-4
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Dec 2008

    Keywords

    • Discrete choice
    • Empirical discrete games
    • Market entry
    • Marketing

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