TY - JOUR
T1 - Designing Quality Certificates
T2 - Insights from eBay
AU - Hui, Xiang
AU - Jin, Ginger Zhe
AU - Liu, Meng
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© American Marketing Association 2024.
PY - 2025/2
Y1 - 2025/2
N2 - Quality certification is a common tool to enhance trust in marketplaces. Should the certification be based on consumer reports, such as ratings, or administrative data on seller behavior, such as the number of seller-initiated cancellations? In theory, incorporating consumer reports makes the quality certificate more relevant for consumer experience but may discourage seller effort, because consumer reports can be driven by factors not entirely within sellers’ control. Alternatively, using administrative data makes the certification more controllable by sellers, but these data track only a subset of seller behavior and may not be fully aligned with consumer experience. To answer the preceding question, the authors study a major redesign of eBay's quality certification that removed most consumer reports from its criteria and added administrative data. This change motivates seller effort in dimensions highlighted by the new criteria, as well as enabling sellers to more precisely target their effort at the threshold. Buyers place a higher value on the quality certificate and are more likely to purchase again on the platform in markets where administrative data are more correlated with consumer reports. Last, the proportion of certified sellers becomes more homogenized across markets, and sales seem to become more concentrated toward large sellers.
AB - Quality certification is a common tool to enhance trust in marketplaces. Should the certification be based on consumer reports, such as ratings, or administrative data on seller behavior, such as the number of seller-initiated cancellations? In theory, incorporating consumer reports makes the quality certificate more relevant for consumer experience but may discourage seller effort, because consumer reports can be driven by factors not entirely within sellers’ control. Alternatively, using administrative data makes the certification more controllable by sellers, but these data track only a subset of seller behavior and may not be fully aligned with consumer experience. To answer the preceding question, the authors study a major redesign of eBay's quality certification that removed most consumer reports from its criteria and added administrative data. This change motivates seller effort in dimensions highlighted by the new criteria, as well as enabling sellers to more precisely target their effort at the threshold. Buyers place a higher value on the quality certificate and are more likely to purchase again on the platform in markets where administrative data are more correlated with consumer reports. Last, the proportion of certified sellers becomes more homogenized across markets, and sales seem to become more concentrated toward large sellers.
KW - e-commerce
KW - moral hazard
KW - platform
KW - quality certificate
KW - reputation
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85206943058
U2 - 10.1177/00222437241270222
DO - 10.1177/00222437241270222
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85206943058
SN - 0022-2437
VL - 62
SP - 40
EP - 60
JO - Journal of Marketing Research
JF - Journal of Marketing Research
IS - 1
ER -