Cue-Taking in Congress: Interest Group Signals from Dear Colleague Letters

  • Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier
  • , Dino P. Christenson
  • , Alison W. Craig

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    42 Scopus citations

    Abstract

    Why do some pieces of legislation move forward while others languish? We address this fundamental question by examining the role of interest groups in Congress, specifically the effect of their legislative endorsements in Dear Colleague letters. These letters provide insights into the information that members use to both influence and make policy decisions. We demonstrate that endorsements from particularly well-connected interest groups are a strong cue for members with limited information early in the legislative process and help grow the list of bill cosponsors. As bills progress, such groups have less direct weight, while legislation supported by a larger number of organizations and a larger number of cosponsors is more likely to pass. Thus, we illuminate the usage of Dear Colleague letters in Congress, demonstrate how members use interest groups in the legislative process, and shed new light on the varying impact of groups on public policy.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)163-180
    Number of pages18
    JournalAmerican Journal of Political Science
    Volume63
    Issue number1
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Jan 2019

    Fingerprint

    Dive into the research topics of 'Cue-Taking in Congress: Interest Group Signals from Dear Colleague Letters'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

    Cite this