TY - JOUR
T1 - Contractual commitments, bargaining power, and governance inseparability
T2 - Incorporating history into transaction cost theory
AU - Argyres, Nicholas S.
AU - Liebeskind, Julia Porter
PY - 1999/1
Y1 - 1999/1
N2 - We extend transaction cost economics by arguing that prior contractual commitments made by a firm can limit its ability to differentiate or change its governance arrangements in the future - a condition we term governance inseparability. Changes in bargaining power between a firm and its exchange partners also can result in governance inseparability. Consequently, governance choice may be more particularistic than the current version of transaction cost economics allows. We provide several testable propositions.
AB - We extend transaction cost economics by arguing that prior contractual commitments made by a firm can limit its ability to differentiate or change its governance arrangements in the future - a condition we term governance inseparability. Changes in bargaining power between a firm and its exchange partners also can result in governance inseparability. Consequently, governance choice may be more particularistic than the current version of transaction cost economics allows. We provide several testable propositions.
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/0033249244
U2 - 10.5465/AMR.1999.1580440
DO - 10.5465/AMR.1999.1580440
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:0033249244
SN - 0363-7425
VL - 24
SP - 49
EP - 63
JO - Academy of Management Review
JF - Academy of Management Review
IS - 1
ER -