Color objectivism and color projectivism

Edward Wilson Averill; Allan Hazlett

doi:10.1080/09515089.2011.562645

Color objectivism and color projectivism

Edward Wilson Averill
, Allan Hazlett

Department of Philosophy

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

4 Scopus citations

Abstract

Objectivism and projectivism are standardly taken to be incompatible theories of color. Here we argue that this incompatibility is only apparent: objectivism and projectivism, properly articulated so as to deal with basic objections, are in fundamental agreement about the ontology of color and the phenomenology of color perception.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	751-765
Number of pages	15
Journal	Philosophical Psychology
Volume	24
Issue number	6
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2011.562645
State	Published - Dec 2011

Keywords

Color
Objectivism
Physicalism
Projectivism

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10.1080/09515089.2011.562645

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title = "Color objectivism and color projectivism",

abstract = "Objectivism and projectivism are standardly taken to be incompatible theories of color. Here we argue that this incompatibility is only apparent: objectivism and projectivism, properly articulated so as to deal with basic objections, are in fundamental agreement about the ontology of color and the phenomenology of color perception.",

keywords = "Color, Objectivism, Physicalism, Projectivism",

author = "Averill, \{Edward Wilson\} and Allan Hazlett",

year = "2011",

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AB - Objectivism and projectivism are standardly taken to be incompatible theories of color. Here we argue that this incompatibility is only apparent: objectivism and projectivism, properly articulated so as to deal with basic objections, are in fundamental agreement about the ontology of color and the phenomenology of color perception.

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KW - Objectivism

KW - Physicalism

KW - Projectivism

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/84858843760

U2 - 10.1080/09515089.2011.562645

DO - 10.1080/09515089.2011.562645

M3 - Article

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VL - 24

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EP - 765

JO - Philosophical Psychology

JF - Philosophical Psychology

IS - 6

ER -

Color objectivism and color projectivism

Abstract

Keywords

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