TY - JOUR
T1 - Coherentism and justified inconsistent beliefs
T2 - A solution
AU - Kvanvig, Jonathan L.
PY - 2012/3
Y1 - 2012/3
N2 - The most pressing difficulty coherentism faces is, I believe, the problem of justified inconsistent beliefs. In a nutshell, there are cases in which our beliefs appear to be both fully rational and justified, and yet the contents of the beliefs are inconsistent, often knowingly so. This fact contradicts the seemingly obvious idea that a minimal requirement for coherence is logical consistency. Here, I present a solution to one version of this problem.
AB - The most pressing difficulty coherentism faces is, I believe, the problem of justified inconsistent beliefs. In a nutshell, there are cases in which our beliefs appear to be both fully rational and justified, and yet the contents of the beliefs are inconsistent, often knowingly so. This fact contradicts the seemingly obvious idea that a minimal requirement for coherence is logical consistency. Here, I present a solution to one version of this problem.
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/84858239970
U2 - 10.1111/j.2041-6962.2011.00090.x
DO - 10.1111/j.2041-6962.2011.00090.x
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84858239970
SN - 0038-4283
VL - 50
SP - 21
EP - 41
JO - Southern Journal of Philosophy
JF - Southern Journal of Philosophy
IS - 1
ER -