Can labor markets help resolve collusion?

Jeremy Bertomeu

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2006.11.007

Can labor markets help resolve collusion?

Jeremy Bertomeu

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

1 Scopus citations

Abstract

We show that, in a multi-agent contract setting, the principal can effectively rule out tacit collusion among agents (i.e., "bad" equilibrium) by posting permanent job openings to an external labor market. That is, a simple "market-like" employment mechanism can yield collusion-proof contracts.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	355-361
Number of pages	7
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	95
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2006.11.007
State	Published - Jun 2007

Keywords

Collusion
Implementation
Market
Replacement
Tacit

Access to Document

10.1016/j.econlet.2006.11.007

Cite this

@article{22f141a27ae0475d8d4197f7adab9f96,

title = "Can labor markets help resolve collusion?",

abstract = "We show that, in a multi-agent contract setting, the principal can effectively rule out tacit collusion among agents (i.e., {"}bad{"} equilibrium) by posting permanent job openings to an external labor market. That is, a simple {"}market-like{"} employment mechanism can yield collusion-proof contracts.",

keywords = "Collusion, Implementation, Market, Replacement, Tacit",

author = "Jeremy Bertomeu",

year = "2007",

month = jun,

doi = "10.1016/j.econlet.2006.11.007",

language = "English",

volume = "95",

pages = "355--361",

journal = "Economics Letters",