Abstract
INTRODUCTION: Two often repeated notions run through law and society research: one, that law is a mirror of society, and two, that a gap exists between law and society. The first notion, in its extreme form, suggests that the relationship between law and society is so intimate that it is incorrect to interject the conjunction “and” between these terms – law is always integrated within and produced by society and society courses through every aspect of law such that they cannot be separated. The second notion, in its extreme form, suggests that law operates within but is autonomous from society – a self-defining and self-constituting complex of socially constructed legal practices, institutions, bodies of knowledge, and systems of communication and language Although many law and society scholars accept both propositions as virtual truisms, an evident tension, if not outright contradiction, exists between them, for they stake out antipodal positions on the law-society relationship. Contradiction is avoided by eschewing the extreme form of each. The middle ground – adopted by most scholars – relies on a positivistic understanding to identify law as the law-related activities of legal professionals and officials (picked out from society in this specific sense), while also acknowledging that law is always infused with and subject to social influences and factors. Under this common understanding, law is separable from society, contrary to the extreme mirror position, while law is also continuously subject to pervasive social influences, contrary to the extreme autonomy pole.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | Social and Political Foundations of Constitutions |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press |
| Pages | 584-610 |
| Number of pages | 27 |
| ISBN (Electronic) | 9781139507509 |
| ISBN (Print) | 9781107032880 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Jan 1 2012 |