TY - GEN
T1 - Automated mechanism design in infinite games of incomplete information
T2 - 2007 AAAI Spring Symposium
AU - Vorobeychik, Yevgeniy
AU - Reeves, Daniel M.
PY - 2007
Y1 - 2007
N2 - We present a functional framework for automated mechanism design based on a two-stage game model of strategic interaction between the designer and the mechanism participants, and apply it to several classes of two-player infinite games of incomplete information. Our approach yields optimal or nearly optimal mechanisms in two application domains using various objective functions. By comparing our results with known optimal mechanisms, and in some cases improving on the best known mechanisms, we show that ours is a promising approach to parametric design of indirect mechanisms.
AB - We present a functional framework for automated mechanism design based on a two-stage game model of strategic interaction between the designer and the mechanism participants, and apply it to several classes of two-player infinite games of incomplete information. Our approach yields optimal or nearly optimal mechanisms in two application domains using various objective functions. By comparing our results with known optimal mechanisms, and in some cases improving on the best known mechanisms, we show that ours is a promising approach to parametric design of indirect mechanisms.
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/37349074746
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:37349074746
SN - 9781577353119
T3 - AAAI Spring Symposium - Technical Report
SP - 76
EP - 84
BT - Game Theoretic and Decision Theoretic Agents - Papers from the 2007 AAAI Spring Symposium, Technical Report
Y2 - 26 March 2007 through 28 March 2007
ER -