Adversarial detection as a zero-sum game

  • K. G. Vamvoudakis
  • , J. P. Hespanha
  • , B. Sinopoli
  • , Y. Mo

Research output: Contribution to journalConference articlepeer-review

18 Scopus citations

Abstract

We propose a new game theoretic approach to estimate a binary random variable based on a vector of sensor measurements that may be corrupted by an adversary. The problem is formulated as a zero-sum partial information game in which a detector attempts to minimize the probability of error and an attacker attempts to maximize this probability. Explicit mixed policies are computed using the matrix form of the game and exploiting sensor symmetry to reduce complexity and find closed-form solutions.

Original languageEnglish
Article number6426383
Pages (from-to)7133-7138
Number of pages6
JournalProceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control
DOIs
StatePublished - 2012
Event51st IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2012 - Maui, HI, United States
Duration: Dec 10 2012Dec 13 2012

Keywords

  • Adversarial detection
  • byzantine sensors
  • computer security
  • estimation
  • mixed policies
  • zero-sum games

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