A solution to matching with preferences over colleagues

Federico Echenique; M. Bumin Yenmez

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2006.07.003

A solution to matching with preferences over colleagues

Federico Echenique
, M. Bumin Yenmez

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

67 Scopus citations

Abstract

We study many-to-one matchings, such as the assignment of students to colleges, where the students have preferences over the other students who would attend the same college. It is well known that the core of this model may be empty, without strong assumptions on agents' preferences. We introduce a method that finds all core matchings, if any exist. The method requires no assumptions on preferences. Our method also finds certain partial solutions that may be useful when the core is empty.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	46-71
Number of pages	26
Journal	Games and Economic Behavior
Volume	59
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2006.07.003
State	Published - Apr 2007

Keywords

Coalition formation
College admission problem
Core
Simple matchings
Stability
Two-sided matching

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10.1016/j.geb.2006.07.003

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AB - We study many-to-one matchings, such as the assignment of students to colleges, where the students have preferences over the other students who would attend the same college. It is well known that the core of this model may be empty, without strong assumptions on agents' preferences. We introduce a method that finds all core matchings, if any exist. The method requires no assumptions on preferences. Our method also finds certain partial solutions that may be useful when the core is empty.

KW - Coalition formation

KW - College admission problem

KW - Core

KW - Simple matchings

KW - Stability

KW - Two-sided matching

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/33947591300

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VL - 59

SP - 46

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JO - Games and Economic Behavior

JF - Games and Economic Behavior

IS - 1

ER -

A solution to matching with preferences over colleagues

Abstract

Keywords

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